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REAL ESTATE LAW
Brian R. Marron *
Christopher M. Gill **
I. INTRODUCTION
The following is a survey of significant judicial decisions in the
Commonwealth of Virginia during the period beginning June 1,
2002, and ending June 1, 2003. The cases in this article discuss,
among other things, a number of issues pertaining to contract in-
terpretation, land trusts, condemnation, marketability of title,
easements, and restrictions on the use of land. This article will
also review a number of legislative changes from the 2003 Session
of the General Assembly of Virginia. These legislative changes in-
clude matters relating to banking and finance, privacy, conserva-
tion, changes to zoning, subdivision enabling legislation, and
matters relating to condominiums and planned unit develop-
ments.
II. RECENT CASE LAW
A. The Interplay of Option and Right of First Refusal in a Lease
In Shepherd v. Davis,1 Richard F. and Amelia D. Davis (collec-
tively the "Davises") entered into an installment land sale con-
tract with George J. Parker ("Parker") for the purchase of land
("Parker Parcel").2 Under the contract, the Davises would not re-
ceive title to the Parker Parcel until they paid the full purchase
* Partner, Cantor Arkema, P.C., Richmond, Virginia. B.A., 1981, Muhlenberg Col-
lege; J.D., 1984, Marshall-Wythe School of Law at the College of William and Mary.
** B.A., 2000, University of Virginia; Candidate, J.D., 2004, University of Richmond
School of Law.
1. 265 Va. 108, 574 S.E.2d 514 (2003).
2. Id. at 112, 574 S.E.2d at 516.
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price.3 The Davises had no right to assign the contract to a third
party.4 The Davises entered into a lease agreement ("Shepherd
Lease") with William R. Shepherd, Jr. ("Shepherd") pursuant to
which Shepherd leased the Parker Parcel, as well as another par-
cel that was owned by the Davises ("Davis Parcel").5 The lease
agreement contained a fixed price option to purchase both par-
cels, as well as a right of first refusal.6
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 112-13, 574 S.E.2d at 516.
6. Id. at 113-14, 574 S.E.2d at 516-17. The relevant sections of the lease state the
following:
23. OPTION TO PURCHASE AND RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL
23.1. Option. Upon compliance with the provisions of this Section 23, Tenant
shall have the sole and exclusive Option to purchase the Property pursuant to
the terms of this Agreement for the continuous period of time commencing on
the Commencement Date and ending on the date the lease terminates. If the
Option is properly and timely exercised, as provided in this Agreement, a con-
tract shall then exist between Landlord and Tenant pursuant to which Land-
lord agrees to sell and Tenant agrees to buy the Property upon the terms and
conditions specified in this Section 23.
23.2. Exercise of Option. The Option may be exercised, subject to the terms of
paragraph 23.8, by Tenant at any time prior to the expiration of the Lease,
which shall be midnight of the last day this lease is in effect. Tenant shall ex-
ercise the Option by sending written notice to Landlord prior to the expira-
tion date of the Option specifying Tenant's desire to exercise the Option.
23.3. Purchase Price. The purchase price ("Purchase Price") to be paid by
Tenant to Landlord for the Property shall be ONE HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND AND NOI100 DOLLARS ($150,000.00)[.]
23.4. Title. Landlord shall convey to Tenant, at Closing, good, indefeasible
and marketable title to the Property, free and clear of all liens, encumbrances
and easements, other than those to which the Tenant fails to object ...
... If Landlord is unwilling or unable to correct such objections within [thirty
days,] Tenant shall have the option of taking such title as Landlord can give
without abatement of the Purchase Price, or terminating this Agreement[.]
23.11. Right of First Refusal. Notwithstanding anything contained in this
Agreement to the contrary, if Landlord shall receive from a third party ("Of-
feror") a bona fide written offer to purchase the Property, or any part of it,
Landlord shall send to Tenant a copy of the proposed offer ("Offer"), with no-
tification that Landlord intends to accept the Offer. Tenant shall have the
right within ten (10) days thereafter to exercise the Option to purchase the
Property, or such part of it described in the Offer, pursuant to the terms and
conditions contained in the Offer. If Tenant does not elect to purchase the
Property or such part of it described in the Offer, within such five (5) day pe-
riod, Landlord may sell the Property or the part described in the Offer to the
Offeror. If Landlord does not sell the Property or any part of it, according to
[Vol. 38:223
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After a time, a third party ("Henning") submitted an offer to
the Davises to purchase both the Parker Parcel and the Davis
Parcel.7 The Davises entered a contract with Henning ("Henning
Contract"), which was conditioned upon Shepherd's waiver of the
right of first refusal.' The Davises then submitted the Henning
Contract to Shepherd in conformity with the lease provision
granting Shepherd the right of first refusal.9 Shepherd did not re-
spond to the right of first refusal and elected, instead, to exercise
the fixed price option under the lease at a lower cost.' The Dav-
ises refused to close with either party and were sued by both."
Upon considering the evidence, the Commissioner in Chancery
issued a report holding: (1) that Shepherd waived his right of first
refusal by failing to respond to the Henning offer, because the
right of first refusal language in the lease overrode the option
clause; (2) that Henning was not entitled to specific performance
under the Henning Contract, because the Davises could not con-
vey marketable title to the Parker Parcel; (3) that Henning
should recover restitutionary damages, as well as attorneys' fees
and costs; and (4) that Shepherd should also recover certain
costs.
12
Analyzing the language of the Shepherd Lease, the Supreme
Court of Virginia considered a number of decisions in which
courts considered the interplay of rights of first refusal and fixed
price options. 3 However, the court found it unnecessary to select
the Offer, then Tenant's right of first refusal shall remain in full force.
Id. (quoting the lease creating the dual option) (alterations in original).
7. Id. at 114, 574 S.E.2d at 577.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 115, 574 S.E.2d at 518. Under the Commissioner's initial report, Henning
was to receive $376,430 to compensate Henning for the loss of his bargain. Id. The Com-
missioner later revised his initial report, reducing the damage award to nominal and out-
of-pocket damages. Id. at 116, 574 S.E.2d at 518. The Commissioner reasoned that Hen-
ning had failed to meet his burden of showing that the Davises had acted in bad faith-
voluntarily deciding not to perform or neglecting or refusing to perform the contract. Id. at
116, 574 S.E.2d at 518-19.
13. Id. at 118, 574 S.E.2d at 520. The Supreme Court of Virginia noted that some
courts previously held that a lessee may exercise a fixed-price option without regard to a
first right of refusal. Id. (citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Chiodo, 804 F.2d 284, 286 (4th Cir. 1986);
Amoco Oil Co. v. Snyder, 478 A.2d 795, 798-99 (Pa. 1984); Butler v. Richardson, 60 A.2d
718, 722 (R.I. 1948); Crowley v. Patterson, 306 N.W.2d 871, 875 (S.D. 1981)). The court
also acknowledged that other courts have concluded that a lessee forfeits the right to pur-
2003]
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one of these positions, because the clear and unambiguous lan-
guage in the lease dictated which provision should control.14 The
prefatory language to the right of first refusal "'[n]otwithstanding
anything... to the contrary,"' meant that the right of first refusal
would operate despite the fixed price option and that the right of
first refusal would take precedence over the option.'" Having for-
feited the right of first refusal by failing to respond to it, Shep-
herd was not entitled to receive either specific performance or
damages from the Davises. 6
In the Henning appeal, the court addressed two questions: (1)
whether the chancellor erred by refusing to grant specific per-
formance to Henning, and (2) whether the chancellor erred by
awarding only nominal damages rather than damages based on
the benefit of Henning's bargain. 7 In affirming the denial of spe-
cific performance, the court dismissed the notion that the chan-
cellor should have ordered the Davises to convey at least the
Davis Parcel.'" The court was not persuaded to apply the rule
that when there is a deficiency of title, the purchaser has the op-
tion to require the seller to convey such title as the seller is able,
with the abatement of the purchase price for any deficiency.' 9
This rule is not absolute and does not apply when, in the discre-
tion of the court, the plaintiff asks the court to substitute an
agreement for which the parties did not contract.2 °
On the issue of damages, the court agreed with the Commis-
sioner that Henning should only be entitled to restitutionary
damages.2' The court applied the general rule "'that the measure
of damages for failure of the vendor to convey as agreed is the
purchase price, or any part thereof, paid by the vendee, with in-
terest from the date of payment,"' with damages for the loss of the
chase under a fixed-option when the lessee refuses to exercise a right of first refusal after
being presented with a third-party offer. Id. (citing Shell Oil Corp. v. Blumberg, 159 F.2d
251, 252-53 (5th Cir. 1946); Northwest Racing Ass'n v. Hunt, 156 N.E.2d 285, 288 (Mll.
App. Ct. 1959); Tarrant v. Self, 387 N.E.2d 1349, 1353 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979); M & M Oil Co.
v. Finch, 640 P.2d 317, 320-21 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982)).
14. Id. at 118-19, 574 S.E.2d at 520.
15. Id. at 119, 574 S.E.2d at 520 (quoting the Shepherd Lease) (alteration in original).
16. Id. at 121, 574 S.E.2d at 521.
17. Id. at 121, 574 S.E.2d at 521-22.
18. Id. at 123-24, 574 S.E.2d at 523.
19. Id. at 122, 574 S.E.2d at 522.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 126, 574 S.E.2d at 524.
[Vol. 38:223
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bargain if the purchaser proves that the seller acted in bad faith,
voluntarily disabled himself from making the conveyance, or will-
fully neglected or refused to do so.22 The court also found that
Henning failed to meet his burden of proving with reasonable cer-
tainty the amount of damages and the cause from which they re-
sulted.23 The expert testimony on the value of the property was
premised upon a sale of the subject property to the developer of
adjacent property and based upon the premise that the subject
property could be rezoned to accommodate such use.24 The court
remanded Henning's claim for additional attorneys' fees to the
Commissioner.25
B. Capacity of the Party Executing a Deed/Trust
In the case of Austin v. City of Alexandria,26 the settlor con-
veyed real property to himself as trustee for the benefit of a trust
("Trust I") in 1993.27 The settlor was the lifetime beneficiary of
Trust I, and upon his death the trust corpus was to be distributed
to three remainder trusts.2" A deed in trust, executed concur-
rently with Trust I, specifically provided that revocation of the
trust was to be accomplished by deed.29
In 1999 the settlor, in his individual capacity, executed a sec-
ond deed purporting to convey the same property to himself as
trustee for a second trust ("Trust II"), with different beneficiar-
ies.30 The 1999 deed made no reference to the prior conveyance of
the property for the benefit of Trust L" Shortly after recording
the second deed, the settlor, as trustee under Trust II, executed a
contract to sell the property to a third party.32 Before the sched-
uled closing under the contract, the settlor died, and new trustees
22. Id. at 124, 574 S.E.2d at 523 (quoting Williams v. Snider, 190 Va. 226, 228, 56
S.E.2d 63, 64 (1949)).
23. Id. at 125, 574 S.E.2d at 524.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 126, 574 S.E.2d at 525.
26. 265 Va. 89, 574 S.E.2d 289 (2003).
27. Id. at 91-92, 574 S.E.2d at 290.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 92, 574 S.E.2d at 290-91.
30. Id. at 92-93, 574 S.E.2d at 291.
31. Id. at 93, 574 S.E.2d at 291.
32. Id.
20031
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were appointed for Trust I and Trust 11. 3' The substitute trustee
under Trust I filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to es-
tablish that he held legal title to the property for the benefit of
Trust I and that he was not bound by the contract executed by
the settlor, as the trustee for Trust II."
The lower court found that the 1999 deed was an effective revo-
cation of the initial trust, that the trustee for Trust II held legal
title to the property, and that the contract in favor of the third
party was valid.3"
The Supreme Court of Virginia addressed the question of
whether title was conveyed by the 1999 deed or whether, as a
matter of law, the trustee still owned the property for the benefit
of Trust I.36 In holding in favor of Trust I, the court reasoned that
upon conveying the property to himself as trustee for Trust I, the
settlor's interest in the property as beneficiary became person-
alty.37 The supreme court reversed the trial court, reasoning that
before the settlor could again convey the property in his individ-
ual capacity, Trust I had to be revoked in accordance with the re-
quirements of the trust agreement for Trust 1.31 Consequently,
the purported conveyance of the property for the benefit of Trust
II was ineffective. 9
C. Condemnation
In Ottofaro v. City of Hampton,4" the Supreme Court of Virginia
was asked to consider: (1) whether a condemnation was for a
permitted public purpose; (2) whether the resolution by the city
authorizing the condemnation was adequate; (3) whether the
delegation of authority over certain aspects of the condemnation
proceedings to the city attorney was appropriate; and (4) whether
the condemnation of the residue was permissible.4'
33. Id. at 93-94, 574 S.E.2d at 291.
34. Id. at 94, 574 S.E.2d at 291-92.
35. Id. at 94, 574 S.E.2d at 292.
36. Id. at 95, 574 S.E.2d at 292.
37. Id. at 95, 574 S.E.2d at 292-93.
38. Id. at 96, 574 S.E.2d at 293.
39. Id. at 97, 574 S.E.2d at 293.
40. 265 Va. 26, 574 S.E.2d 235 (2003).
41. Id. at 28, 32-34, 574 S.E.2d at 235-36, 238-39.
[Vol. 38:223
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In this case, the plaintiffs entire property was condemned by
the City of Hampton to facilitate the construction of a planned
road, with the residue devolving to the city's Industrial Develop-
ment Authority. 2 The residue was leased by the Industrial De-
velopment Authority to a private developer.4 The supreme court
found that the condemnation was for an appropriate public pur-
pose, because public interest dominated any consequential pri-
vate gain, and because the property came under the control of the
governing body.' The city's comprehensive plan had reflected the
road in this location for a number of years.4 5 The court also noted
that the city's Industrial Development Authority would control
the residue, and the residue would be leased to a private devel-
oper in a manner consistent with the mission of the Industrial
Development Authority.46
The court also disagreed that alleged ambiguity in the city's
condemnation resolution constituted an improper delegation to
the city attorney of the city's condemnation powers.4" The resolu-
tion at issue specified the parcels to be taken and the use to
which they would be put.4"
The court also rejected the plaintiffs contention that the reso-
lution was defective for failing to specify what portion of the
property was to be taken.49 The language at issue directed the
city attorney to acquire the entire tract of land upon which the
road would be located, but only if the requirements of Virginia
Code section 33.1-91 governing the condemnation of residue were
satisfied. 0 The resolution did not confer upon the city attorney
42. Id. at 29-30, 574 S.E.2d at 236.
43. Id. at 30, 574 S.E.2d at 236-37.
44. Id. at 32, 574 S.E.2d at 238.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 32-33, 574 S.E.2d at 238. Virginia Code section 15.2-1903(B) states:
Prior to initiating condemnation proceedings, the governing body shall adopt
a resolution or ordinance approving the proposed public use and directing the
acquisition of property for the public use by condemnation or other means.
The resolution or ordinance shall state the use to which the property shall be
put and the necessity therefor.
VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1903(B) (Repl. Vol. 2003).
48. Ottofaro, 265 Va. at 33, 574 S.E.2d at 238.
49. Id. at 34, 574 S.E.2d at 239.
50. Id. Under Virginia Code section 33.1-91, a city can condemn an entire parcel:
whenever the remainder of such tract or part thereof can no longer be utilized
for the purpose for which the entire tract is then being utilized, or a portion of
2003]
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discretionary authority to decide how much land to acquire by
condemnation.51 The court found that the condemnation of the en-
tire parcel did not violate Virginia Code section 33.1_91.2 The
court relied upon Virginia Code section 33.1-91 in finding that the
exercise of eminent domain over an entire tract of land is appro-
priate when the remainder of the condemned tract can no longer
be utilized for the purposes for which the entire tract was being
utilized. 3 The court noted that the residue of the Plaintiffs land,
which constituted less than two acres, could no longer be used as
residential rental property and would no longer have access to a
public highway.54
D. Marketability of Title
The case of Haisfield v. Lape5" involves the conveyance of two
separate portions of a 148-acre farm.56 In 1994 the Moseses ac-
quired approximately forty-eight acres of the farm, including the
original farmhouse. The seller also placed a line-of-sight ease-
ment over the 100-acre residual tract in favor of the Moseses. 8
Subsequently, Haisfield entered into a contract for the purchase
of the residual land. 9 The contract contained a $50,000 earnest
money deposit which would constitute liquidated damages in the
event of the purchaser's breach.6 ° The contract also provided that
the seller was obligated to convey the property "'by a general war-
ranty deed ... free of all encumbrances, tenancies, and liens...
a building is to be taken or the cost of removal or relocation of the buildings,
or other improvements on the remaining portion, necessitated by the taking,
would exceed the cost of destroying such buildings or other improvements, or
the highway project will leave the remaining portions without a means of ac-
cess to a public highway... provided, however, that the [City] shall not ac-
quire the remainder of such tracts ... by condemnation where the remaining
portion is in excess of two acres.
VA. CODE ANN. § 33.1-91 (Cum. Supp. 2003).
51. Ottofaro, 265 Va. at 34, 574 S.E.2d at 239.
52. Id. at 34-35, 574 S.E.2d at 239.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 35, 574 S.E.2d at 239.
55. 264 Va. 632, 570 S.E.2d 794 (2002).
56. Id. at 634-35, 570 S.E.2d at 795.
57. Id. at 635, 570 S.E.2d at 795.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 634-35, 570 S.E.2d at 795.
60. Id. at 635, 570 S.E.2d at 795.
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but subject to such restrictive covenants and utility easements of
record which do not materially and adversely affect the use of the
Property for residential purposes or render the title unmarket-
able."" Prior to closing, Haisfield discovered the line-of-sight
easement prohibiting the construction of a residence within sight
of the original farmhouse and refused to close. 2 The trial court
awarded the earnest money deposit to the seller, holding that
"the line-of-sight easement did not materially or adversely affect
the use of the... property for residential purposes nor did it ren-
der title unmarketable under the terms of the Purchase Agree-
ment. '63
However, the Supreme Court of Virginia found that the restric-
tion rendered title to the property unmarketable and held in fa-
vor of Haisfield.' The court reasoned that the line-of-sight ease-
ment acts as a building restriction upon the property, rendering
title unmarketable.65 The court also noted that the line-of-sight
easement was not an "'open, visible, physical [e]ncumbrance'" on
the property that was taken into consideration when fixing the
price of the property.66
E. Condominiums, Awards of Attorneys Fees
In Mozley v. Prestwould Board of Directors,67 a unit owner chal-
lenged the assessment of costs to all unit owners for the replace-
ment of windows in some of the units within the condominium."
Mozley alleged that the windows should not have been character-
ized as limited common elements69 and should not have been
charged to unit owners other than those whose units were served
by the replacement windows. ° Mozley paid the full amount of the
61. Id. at 635-36, 570 S.E.2d at 795 (quoting Paragraph 14 of the Purchase Agree-
ment).
62. Id. at 635, 570 S.E.2d at 795.
63. Id. at 636, 570 S.E.2d at 796.
64. Id. at 637, 570 S.E.2d at 796.
65. Id. at 638, 570 S.E.2d at 797.
66. Id. (quoting Riner v. Lester, 121 Va. 563, 572, 93 S.E. 594, 597 (1917)).
67. 264 Va. 549, 570 S.E.2d 817 (2002).
68. Id. at 552, 570 S.E.2d at 819.
69. Id. A "limited common element" is defined as "a portion of the common elements
reserved for the exclusive use of those entitled to the use of one or more, but less than all,
of the units." VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.41 (Repl. Vol. 2003).
70. Mozley, 264 Va. at 552, 570 S.E.2d at 819.
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assessment against her and attempted to nonsuit the case after
the Prestwould Board of Directors ("Board") filed its motion for
summary judgment with the lower court.71 The chancellor denied
Mozley's motion to nonsuit and granted the Board's cross-motion
for summary judgment.72 The court also awarded the Board at-
torneys' fees under Virginia Code sections 55-79.53(A) and 55-
79.84, as well as costs totalling $15,855.08. 73
On review, the Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that Mo-
zley's view of Virginia Code section 55-79.84 was correct in that
the plain language of the statute authorizes an award of attor-
neys' fees only for suits brought by a unit owners' association
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 554, 570 S.E.2d at 820. Virginia Code section 55-79.53(A) states:
The declarant, every unit owner, and all those entitled to occupy a unit shall
comply with all lawful provisions of this chapter and all provisions of the con-
dominium instruments. Any lack of such compliance shall be grounds for an
action or suit to recover sums due, for damages or injunctive relief, or for any
other remedy available at law or in equity, maintainable by the unit owners'
association, or by its executive organ or any managing agent on behalf of such
association, or, in any proper case, by one or more aggrieved unit owners on
their own behalf or as a class action. A unit owners' association shall have
standing to sue in its own name for any claims or actions related to the com-
mon elements as provided in subsection B of § 55-79.80. The prevailing party
shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorneys' fees and costs expended in
the matter.
VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.53(A) (Repl. Vol. 2003). Virginia Code section 55-79.80(B) provides
in relevant part:
Except to the extent prohibited by the condominium instruments, and subject
to any restrictions and limitations specified therein, the executive organ of
the unit owners' association, if any, and if not, then the unit owners' associa-
tion itself, shall have the irrevocable power as attorney-in-fact on behalf of all
the unit owners and their successors in title with respect to the common ele-
ments, including without limitation the right, in the name of the unit owners'
association,... (ii) to assert, through litigation or otherwise, defend against,
compromise, adjust, and settle any claims or actions related to common ele-
ments ....
Id. § 55-79.80(B) (Repl. Vol. 2003). Virginia Code section 55-79.84 states, in relevant part:
(A) The unit owners' association shall have a lien on every condominium unit
for unpaid assessments levied against that condominium unit in accordance
with the provisions of this chapter and all lawful provisions of the condomin-
ium instruments.
(E) The judgment or decree in an action brought pursuant to this section shall
include, without limitation, reimbursement for costs and attorneys' fees of the
prevailing party.
Id. § 55-79.84(A)-(E) (Repl. Vol. 2003).
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to enforce a lien for unpaid assessments levied against a condo-
minium unit owner in accordance with the Virginia Condomin-
ium Act ("VCA").74 However, the court did not agree with Mozley's
interpretation that Virginia Code section 55-79.53(A) only justi-
fies an award of attorneys' fees and costs in an action brought by
the unit owners' association against an individual unit owner for
failure to comply with provisions of the condominium instruments
or the VCA.75 The court noted that the plain language of Virginia
Code section 55-79.53(A) authorizes the award of attorneys' fees
for actions arising out of a "failure to comply with provisions con-
tained in relevant condominium instruments or in the [VCA]," as
well as suits brought related to the common elements.76
Clearly, the case relates to the characterization of certain im-
provements as relating to limited common elements." The court
affirmed the chancellor's ruling pursuant to Virginia Code section
55-79.53(A), finding his ruling to be consistent with the General
Assembly's intent that unit owners will not have to absorb their
association's cost of litigation simply because one unit owner
brings an unsuccessful suit against the association. 7' The court
remanded the case to the chancellor for costs associated with the
appeal.79
F. Federal Statute of Limitations-Deeds of Trust
In Long, Long & Kellerman, P.C. v. Wheeler,8" the Supreme
Court of Virginia was asked to consider whether a private as-
signee of a Small Business Administration ("SBA") loan, secured
by a deed of trust in Virginia property, can foreclose on that deed
of trust more than twenty years after its rpcordation.8 1 In this
case, the deed of trust was given to secure a personal guaranty on
a loan from the SBA.82 The deed of trust, executed on September
30, 1980, provided that the "'instrument [was] to be construed
74. Mozley, 264 Va. at 554-55, 570 S.E.2d at 820.
75. Id. at 555, 570 S.E.2d at 820.
76. Id. at 555, 570 S.E.2d at 821.
77. Id. at 555-56, 570 S.E.2d at 821.
78. Id. at 556, 570 S.E.2d at 821.
79. Id. at 557, 570 S.E.2d at 822.
80. 264 Va. 531, 570 S.E.2d 822 (2002).
81. Id. at 533, 570 S.E.2d at 823.
82. Id.
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and enforced in accordance with applicable Federal law."'8 3 After
the SBA made unsuccessful demands for payment under the
guaranty, the note was transferred to a private party for collec-
tion. 4 Foreclosure proceedings were commenced in 2001, and the
Wheelers filed for an injunction against the foreclosure, claiming
that pursuant to Virginia Code section 8.01-242 a foreclosure
could not be commenced more than twenty years after the recor-
dation of the deed of trust.8 5 The trial court agreed and perma-
nently enjoined the trustee from selling the property."
The trustees appealed, arguing that under 28 U.S.C. § 2415,
Congress established a statute of limitations for such matters by
stating that '"[n] othing herein shall be deemed to limit the time
for bringing an action to establish the title to, or right of posses-
sion of, real or personal property."'87 The court affirmed the trial
court, holding that 28 U.S.C. § 2415 did not establish a statute of
limitations for federal foreclosure actions.8 8 The court also ac-
knowledged that Virginia Code section 8.01-242 could not "bar a
83. Id. (quoting paragraph 16 of the deed of trust).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 533-34, 570 S.E.2d at 823.
86. Id. at 534, 570 S.E.2d at 823. Virginia Code section 8.01-242 states:
No deed of trust or mortgage given to secure the payment of money, other
than credit line deeds of trust described in § 55-58.2, and no lien reserved to
secure the payment of unpaid purchase money, in which no date is fixed for
the maturity of the debt secured by such deed of trust, mortgage, or lien,
shall be enforced after twenty years from the date of the deed of trust, mort-
gage, or other lien.
Id. § 8.01-242 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2003).
87. Wheeler, 264 Va. at534, 570 S.E.2d at 824. 28 U.S.C. § 2415 states in part:
(a) Subject to the provisions of section 2416 of this title, and except as other-
wise provided by Congress, every action for money damages brought by the
United States or an officer or agency thereof which is founded upon any con-
tract express or implied in law or fact, shall be barred unless the complaint is
filed within six years after the right of action accrues or within one year after
final decisions have been rendered in applicable administrative proceedings
required by contract or by law, whichever is later ....
(b) Subject to the provisions of section 2416 of this title, and except as other-
wise provided by Congress, every action for money damages brought by the
United States or an officer or agency thereof which is founded upon a tort
shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within three years after the right
of action first accrues ....
(c) Nothing herein shall be deemed to limit the time for bringing an action to
establish the title to, or right of possession of, real or personal property.
28 U.S.C. § 2415(a)-(c) (2000).
88. Wheeler, 264 Va. at 536, 570 S.E.2d at 824.
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federal agency, such as the [SBA], from initiating foreclosure pro-
ceedings on real property."
8 9
However, the property right in question was no longer in the
hands of a federal agency at the commencement of foreclosure
proceedings.9" The court disagreed with the trustee's assertion
"that as an assignee of a federal agency, the trustee 'stands in the
shoes' of the federal assignor and is not barred from foreclosing
by virtue of any Virginia statute of limitations."91
G. Easements
1. Taylor v. McConchie92
In Taylor v. McConchie, the Supreme Court of Virginia consid-
ered a case in which the grantor of a deed reserved over the ser-
vient parcel an ingress/egress easement which was to "'be of suffi-
cient width to permit the free and convenient passage of motor
vehicles and farm vehicles with loads of hay and other farm prod-
ucts, and with further sufficient width for cuts and fills, and to
permit the convenient working of said road."'93 The plaintiffs en-
tered into a real estate purchase contract for the portion of the
dominant parcel served by the easement.94 In the contract, the
sellers covenanted that they had a right-of-way across the adjoin-
ing property-in the form of an existing road-that extended to
the state road.9 After execution of the contract, but prior to clos-
ing, the sellers entered into a new easement agreement (the "New
Easement") with the adjoining property owners.96 The New
Easement fixed the location of the easement along the "'New
Shale Surface Road'" and also provided that the New Easement
89. Id. at 535, 570 S.E.2d at 824. The court noted that "[tihe federal government and
its agencies are not bound by statutes of limitations unless Congress explicitly states oth-
erwise," due to the common law rule "nullum tempus ocurrit regi," which means "that the
sovereign is immune from the operations of statutes of limitations." Id.
90. See id. at 533-34, 570 S.E.2d at 823.
91. Id. at 537-38, 570 S.E.2d at 825-26 (quoting Union Recovery Ltd. P'ship v. Hor-
ton, 252 Va. 418, 423, 477 S.E.2d 521, 523 (1996)).
92. 264 Va. 377, 569 S.E.2d 35 (2002).
93. Id. at 379, 569 S.E.2d at 36 (quoting the deed in question).
94. Id. at 380, 569 S.E.2d at 36.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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superceded the original reservation.97 At closing, the deed to the
plaintiffs referred to the New Easement agreement and did not
refer to the original reservation easement.9" After closing, the de-
fendants erected fences along the boundary of the road, which
made it impossible for the plaintiffs to traverse the road with
farm vehicles.9" The defendants were not grantors under the New
Easement agreement. 1°a
The plaintiffs sued to establish the location and width of the
road. 1 ' At trial, it was established that the New Easement fell
short of the state road by twenty feet and was, in part, on the
property owned by the defendants. 102 The lower court held that
the portion of the easement not on the grantor's property consti-
tuted a breach of the special warranty in the easement. 1 3 The
lower court also reformed a portion of the New Easement to trav-
erse a different portion of the grantor's property so that it could
extend to the state road, but refused to allow the route or width of
the New Easement to be altered to accommodate farm vehicles.0 4
The supreme court agreed with the trial court, at least in part,
holding that the New Easement supplanted the original grant. 10 5
According to the court, nothing in the New Easement entitled the
plaintiffs to route the easement to better accommodate farm vehi-
cles.' O6 The court held that the doctrine of merger extinguished
the contract of sale-cutting off the plaintiffs claim that the
original reservation could not be extinguished without their con-
sent. 0 7 The language in the deed indicating that the conveyance
was made subject to all easements and rights-of-way of record did
not serve to revive the original reservation. 08
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 381, 569 S.E.2d at 36-37.
100. See id. at 380, 569 S.E.2d at 36.
101. Id. at 381, 569 S.E.2d at 37.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 382-83, 569 S.E.2d at 38.
106. Id. at 383-84, 569 S.E.2d at 38.
107. Id. at 383, 569 S.E.2d at 38.
108. Id.
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2. Shooting Point, L.L.C. v. Wescoat °9
In Shooting Point, L.L.C. v. Wescoat, the plaintiffs owned a
176-acre tract ("Shooting Point Farm") which, among other land
parcels, was served by a recorded easement across a tract of land
owned by John W. Wescoat." ° The easement served as the only
means of access between Shooting Point Farm and a nearby state
highway. 1 ' References to natural markings in the grant fixed the
location of the easement."1 2 Later recorded documents, including
those recorded to subdivide Shooting Point Farm into building
lots, included a plat that depicted by metes and bounds the loca-
tion of the easement." 3 The litigation arose out of Wescoat's ob-
jection to the use of portions of his property outside the original
right-of-way and an alleged overburdening of the easement
caused by the subdivision of the Shooting Point Farm."4 Shooting
Point sought to have several fence posts and stakes removed
along what Wescoat asserted was the right-of-way, because the
posts' locations and the easement's width were not consistent
with the original intended use of the easement and brought the
road too close to the adjacent woodland, making passage diffi-
cult.'15
The Supreme Court of Virginia ruled in favor of Wescoat on the
issue of location, noting that the recorded plat-first depicting the
easement of record-was prepared only five years after the ease-
109. 265 Va. 256, 576 S.E.2d 497 (2003).
110. Id. at 258, 576 S.E.2d at 498.
111. Id.
112. See id. at 259, 576 S.E.2d at 498-99. The easement grant read as follows:
[S]aid right-of-way easement to follow the present road leading from Virginia
State Highway Route 622 to lands ... known as Shooting Point Farm, said
present road running generally in a northerly direction from a point in a turn
of said Virginia State Highway Route 622 to a point at or near a corner of a
certain woods, thence turning in a generally easterly direction and running
along the northern edge of said woods to a point at or near the edge of said
woods, thence turning in a generally northerly direction and following along
the edge of said woods to a point at or near a corner of said woods, thence
turning in a generally easterly direction and running along the edge of said
woods until the boundary line separating Shooting Point Farm from the
[Wescoat parcel] is reached, at which boundary line the said right-of-way
easement terminates.
Id. (quoting the easement grant) (alterations in original).
113. Id. at 260, 576 S.E.2d at 499.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 260-61, 576 S.E.2d at 499.
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ment was established, and subsequent plats placed the easement
in the same location.116 The court found that evidence of usage
was irrelevant, stating that "when a fixed location of a granted
easement is established, [the] location may be changed only with
the express or implied consent of the persons interested." 7
The court also found that the owner of the servient estate did
not meet its burden of establishing that using the land for a resi-
dential subdivision would unreasonably burden the servient es-
tate.1 18 "Generally, when an easement is created by grant or res-
ervation and the instrument creating the easement does not
[specifically] limit its use, the easement may be used for 'any
purpose to which the dominant estate may then, or in the future,
reasonably be devoted."" 9 This general rule, however, "is subject
to the qualification that no use may be made of the easement, dif-
ferent from that established when the easement was created,
which imposes an additional burden on the servient estate.' 2 °
The court reasoned that if the type of use does not change, it is, in
theory, possible that the degree of burden from intensified usage
could be of such a degree as to constitute an additional burden. 2'
However, the court did not believe that the increase in the num-
ber of vehicles using the easement in this case would rise to the
level of an additional burden.
122
H. Restrictions on Use
1. Chesterfield Meadows v. Smith'23
The case of Chesterfield Meadows v. Smith involves the con-
tinuing validity of a covenant against certain uses. 24 In this case,
a covenant was placed on property in 1980, in connection with a
116. Id. at 264, 576 S.E.2d at 501.
117. Id. at 265, 576 S.E.2d at 502.
118. Id. at 266, 576 S.E.2d at 502.
119. Id. at 266, 576 S.E.2d at 502-03 (quoting Hayes v. Aquia Marina, Inc., 243 Va.
255, 258, 414 S.E.2d 820, 822 (1992)).
120. Id. at 266, 576 S.E.2d at 503.
121. Id. at 266-67, 576 S.E.2d at 503.
122. Id. at 267, 576 S.E.2d at 503.
123. 264 Va. 350, 568 S.E.2d 676 (2002).
124. Id. at 351, 568 S.E.2d at 677.
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rezoning of that property for office use. 125 The covenant prohibited
certain retail and commercial activity. 126 The beneficiary of the
covenant was the owner of a historic home known as Wrexham
Hall, which was located across the road from the burdened prop-
erty. 27 Testimony at trial indicated that the purpose of this cove-
nant was to maintain the historic character of the area around
Wrexham Hall.121 In 1985 the Wrexham Hall site was conveyed to
a commercial developer. 129 Wrexham Hall itself was relocated a
few miles down the road, and a strip shopping center was built on
the former Wrexham Hall site. 30 In 1996 a developer later con-
tracted to buy the burdened property and sought to rezone that
property for commercial purposes. 3' When the owner of the shop-
ping center refused to release the covenant, a declaratory judg-
ment action was filed seeking to have the covenant rendered
void.
32
Because the covenant was silent as to its purpose, the Supreme
Court of Virginia held that the trial court could rely upon testi-
mony that the covenant was intended to protect Wrexham Hall
and the historic character of the surrounding area. 133 The court
reasoned that "'covenants restricting the free use of land, al-
though widely used, are not favored... [and that] [slubstantial
doubt or ambiguity is to be resolved against the restrictions and
in favor of the free use of property." 34 In this case, the court con-
cluded that changed conditions had "defeated the purpose of the
restrictive covenant rendering it null and void," since the change
in the area was "'so radical as practically to destroy the essential
objects and purposes of the [covenant].""3
125. Id. at 352, 568 S.E.2d at 677.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 353-54, 568 S.E.2d at 678-79.
129. Id. at 352-53, 568 S.E.2d at 678.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 353, 568 S.E.2d at 678.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 355, 568 S.E.2d at 679.
134. Id. (quoting Woodward v. Morgan, 252 Va. 135, 138, 475 S.E.2d 808, 810 (1996)).
135. ld. at 356, 568 S.E.2d at 680 (quoting Booker v. Old Dominion Land Co., 188 Va.
143, 148, 149 S.E.2d 314, 317 (1948)) (alteration in original).
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2. Forster v. Hall"6
In Forster v. Hall, an owner within a residential subdivision al-
leged a breach of an implied reciprocal negative easement, which
prohibited the placement of a mobile home on any lot within a
subdivision."37 The owners of the offending lots sought to defend
their case by asserting that the use was not prohibited since there
was no restrictive covenant in their chain of title prohibiting the
use of a mobile home, 13' and by asserting that the structure on
their property was no longer a mobile home, because the wheels
and tongue had been removed and the structure set on a masonry
foundation. 139
Of the 113 lots sold within the subdivision, 105 of the lots con-
tained a restriction against parking and/or erecting a single or
doublewide mobile home on the lot.4 ' The chain of title to the
subject property contained no such restriction."' Evidence in the
case suggested that the covenant was included as a matter of
course, unless the purchasing owner requested omission of the
covenant.142 At trial, the developer testified that the intent of the
covenant was to prohibit "mobile homes with 'the tongues sticking
out and the wheels hanging down,"' but not to bar all manufac-
tured homes.4 3 In finding for the defendant, the chancellor con-
cluded that an implied reciprocal negative easement prohibited
the placement of mobile homes on any lot within the subdivision,
but that the structure placed on the defendant's lot did not violate
the restriction.' In reaching this conclusion, the chancellor
found it persuasive that the structures were annexed to the real
estate and that the structures, as they currently existed, were not
the type the developer intended to prohibit with the restrictions
contained in the majority of the deeds.145
136. 265 Va. 293, 576 S.E.2d 746 (2003).
137. Id. at 297-98, 576 S.E.2d at 748.
138. Id. at 299-300, 576 S.E.2d at 749-50.
139. Id. at 300-03, 576 S.E.2d at 750-51.
140. Id. at 298, 576 S.E.2d at 748-49.
141. Id. at 297, 576 S.E.2d at 748.
142. Id. at 298, 576 S.E.2d at 748.
143. Id. at 298, 576 S.E.2d at 749 (quoting the developer's testimony at trial).
144. Id. at 298-99, 576 S.E.2d at 749.
145. Id. at 299, 576 S.E.2d at 749.
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The Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the chancellor's conclu-
sion that an implied reciprocal negative easement did arise be-
cause the:
"common grantor develop[ed] land for sale in lots and pursue[d] a
course of conduct which indicate[d] an intention to follow a general
scheme of development for the benefit of himself and his purchasers
and, in numerous conveyances of the lots, impose[d] substantially
uniform restrictions, conditions, and covenants relating to [the] use
of the property."
146
The supreme court held that the subdivider's omission of the
covenant in certain deeds was not done with the consent of the
remaining lot owners, and the request by certain landowners to
delete the restriction clearly indicated the lot purchasers had ac-
tual or constructive knowledge that the covenant could burden
the use of their lots even though the restriction was omitted from
their deeds. 147
Turning to whether the existing structures violated the implied
reciprocal negative easement, the court analyzed whether the re-
corded covenants contained sufficient ambiguity to allow the use
of parole evidence to prove the intent of the restrictive cove-
nant.4 ' In holding that the covenants did not contain ambiguity,
the court found the testimony of the developer to be irrelevant.
149
Indeed, at the time the first deeds containing the restriction were
recorded, the term "mobile home" was defined by statute.i 0 In
holding for the plaintiff, the court found that the covenants did
not contain language contemplating that a mobile home under
the statutory definition may be transformed into something other
than a mobile home. 1 ' The structures, in this case, violated the
covenant when they were brought to the property. 5 2
146. Id. at 300, 576 S.E.2d at 749-50 (quoting Duvall v. Ford Leasing Dev. Corp., 220
Va. 36, 41, 255 S.E.2d 470, 472 (1979)).
147. Id. at 300, 576 S.E.2d at 750.
148. Id. at 301, 576 S.E.2d at 750-51.
149. Id. at 302-03, 576 S.E.2d at 751.
150. Id. at 301, 576 S.E.2d at 751. The term "mobile home" was defined as:
a building unit constructed on a chassis for towing to the point of use and de-
signed to be used as a dwelling; or two or more such units separately towable,
but designed to be joined together at the point of use to form a single dwelling
and which is designed for removal to and installation or erection on other
sites.
VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.41 (Repl. Vol. 1981); cf. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.41 (Repl. Vol.
2003).
151. Forster, 265 Va. at 302, 576 S.E.2d at 751.
152. Id.
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I. Opposing Land Use Permitting-Anti-Competitive Activity
In the case of Titan America, L.L.C. v. Riverton Investment
Corp.,1"3 the Supreme Court of Virginia was asked to consider a
so-called "Noerr-Pennington doctrine" governing the interplay of
the exercise of free speech in opposition to government permitting
and the anti-competitive effect resulting from both opposing and
financing opposition to the permitting of a competitor's facili-
ties.' In the Noerr"'5  and Pennington 6 cases, the Supreme
Court of the United States held that actions taken to influence
legislative or executive action cannot serve as a basis for violating
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act unless the activities are a mere
sham and are based upon the federal constitutional right to peti-
tion the government. 5 7 In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court
of the United States has expanded this doctrine "to apply to ac-
tions taken in adjudicatory proceedings before administrative
agencies and courts."'
In this case, Titan, a cement company, sought to build a distri-
bution facility.'59 Riverton, a competing cement company, re-
cruited individual litigants to oppose and challenge the permit-
ting of the facility by the local governing body.' Riverton
financed an appeal to the local board of zoning appeals and sub-
sequent litigation at the circuit court level.' 6 ' As a result, Titan
abandoned pursuit of this location for the facility.'62
Subsequently, Titan sought land use permits for a distribution
facility at a second location owned by the Economic Development
Authority of Warren County ("EDA"). '6 Riverton challenged the
sale by the EDA to Titan, claiming that the sale violated the Vir-
ginia Freedom of Information Act'64 and that the EDA failed to
153. 264 Va. 292, 569 S.E.2d 57 (2002).
154. See id. at 296-302, 569 S.E.2d at 58-62.
155. E.R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
156. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
157. See Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144; Titan Am., 264 Va. at 301, 569 S.E.2d at 61.
158. Titan Am., 264 Va. at 301, 569 S.E.2d at 61 (citing Ca. Motor Transp. Co. v.
Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510-11 (1972)).
159. Id. at 296, 569 S.E.2d at 58.
160. Id. at 297, 569 S.E.2d at 59.
161. Id. at 296, 569 S.E.2d at 59.
162. Id. at 298, 569 S.E.2d at 60.
163. Id.
164. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.2-3700 to -3714 (Repl. Vol. 2001 & Cum. Supp. 2003).
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give proper notice of its intention to vote on the sale of the land.165
Ultimately, the lower court denied the injunction filed by River-
ton and other recruited litigants, finding that the EDA gave
proper notice and acted in accordance with its internal guidelines
for selling property.'66 Subsequently, Riverton challenged the zon-
ing administrator's determination that the contemplated use was
a use by-right.'67 The case arising from this dispute ultimately
came before the Supreme Court of Virginia, where the court af-
firmed the zoning administrator's by-right determination. 6 '
Titan subsequently filed suit alleging that the pattern of oppo-
sition, the recruitment of complainants, and the financing of liti-
gation constituted "tortious interference with contract and busi-
ness expectancy, statutory and common-law conspiracy and
defamation."'69 Riverton filed a demurrer and motion for protec-
tive order, citing the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. 7 ° The trial court
sustained Riverton's demurrers, and Titan asserted on appeal
that even if the Noerr-Pennington doctrine was applicable, the
trial court applied the wrong test to determine whether the litiga-
tion was a sham.'7'
The Supreme Court of Virginia, affirming the trial court, held
that a defendant should be allowed to utilize the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine in an action for tortious interference with
business expectancy and conspiracy.'72 In holding for Riverton,
the trial court applied a two-pronged test to determine whether
the conduct of Riverton was protected under the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine. 7 ' First, the trial court looked to "whether
the challenged litigation was objectively baseless"-which occurs
when there can be no reasonable belief that the claim may be
held valid upon adjudication.'74 Second, if the litigation was objec-
tively baseless, whether the litigation was filed with an anti-
165. Titan Am., 264 Va. at 298, 569 S.E.2d at 60.
166. Id. at 298-99, 569 S.E.2d at 60.
167. Id. at 299, 569 S.E.2d at 60.
168. Id. at 299-300, 569 S.E.2d at 60-61.
169. Id. at 300, 569 S.E.2d at 61.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 302, 569 S.E.2d at 62.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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competitive purpose. 7 ' However, "[if the litigation was not objec-
tively baseless, the second inquiry is not necessary."'76 Titan
sought to distinguish this case, because it involved a series of pro-
ceedings and not just a single suit.'77 Titan argued that the court
should have applied "a subjective test when multiple filings
[were] alleged to have been 'pursued to harass, delay and coerce a
competitor.""7 " In addition, Titan argued that the court should
have looked at 'the totality of the filings [in] determin[ing]
whether they were truly undertaken out of a genuine interest in
redressing grievances, or whether they were merely a part of a
pattern or practice of successive filings undertaken for the pur-
pose of harassing and injuring a competitor.""79
In rejecting Titan's argument, the court noted that the "objec-
tively baseless" test provides an "'indispensable objective compo-
nent."""0 The court further concluded that "'anticompetitive in-
tent or purpose alone cannot transform otherwise legitimate
activity into a sham.""1
8
'
The court also rejected Titan's argument that Riverton was not
entitled to protection under Noerr-Pennington, because Riverton
lacked standing to bring the various suits and recruited, solicited,
and financed others in the prosecution of that litigation. 82 The
court rejected this argument reasoning that to hold otherwise
would subject any party who "'provid[es] aid to litigants, whether
through financial backing, legal assistance, amicus briefs, or
moral support' to litigation.8 3
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. (quoting Ca. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 515
(1972)).
179. Id. at 303, 569 S.E.2d at 62-63 (second alteration in original).
180. Id. at 303, 569 S.E.2d at 63 (quoting Profl Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia
Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 58 (1993)).
181. Id. (quoting Profl Real Estate Investors, Inc., 508 U.S. at 59).
182. Id. at 303-05, 569 S.E.2d at 63-64.
183. See id. at 304, 569 S.E.2d at 63-64 (quoting Baltimore Scrap Corp. v. David J. Jo-
seph Co., 237 F.3d 394, 401 (4th Cir. 2001)).
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J. Accord and Satisfaction
In the case of Gelles & Sons General Contracting, Inc. v. Jeffrey
Stack, Inc.,"14 the Supreme Court of Virginia clarified the rule for
accord and satisfaction when payment is tendered as "final pay-
ment" on a contract in which a dispute exists as to the amount
owed."8 5 In this case, a contractor billed an owner for $26,175-
the balance due under the contract.8 6 The owner disputed the bill
in writing, indicating only $13,580 was owed after adjustments
were made for work and materials provided by the owner in order
to properly complete the work.87 The owner then tendered a
check in the amount of $13,580 along with a cover letter indicat-
ing that the enclosed check represented "'final payment on the
contract. ' 8 ' The contractor negotiated the check."9 The court re-
jected the contractor's argument that the owner's letter did not
meet the requirements of Virginia Code section 8.3A-311190 and
that the letter "was neither conspicuous nor sufficiently clear to
inform a reasonable person that cashing the check constituted a
settlement of the claims between the parties."19' The court rea-
soned that the Virginia Code's definition of conspicuous "de-
scribes a physical attribute of the statement, not the content or
meaning conveyed by the statement" and no statute requires "the
184. 264 Va. 285, 569 S.E.2d 406 (2002).
185. See id.
186. Id. at 288, 569 S.E.2d at 407.
187. Id.
188. Id. (quoting Letter from Jeffrey Stack, Inc. to Gelles & Sons General Contracting,
Inc. (Dec. 13, 2000)).
189. Id.
190. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.3A-311 (Repl. Vol. 2001 & Cum. Supp. 2003). This section pro-
vides in pertinent part:
(a) If a person against whom a claim is asserted proves that (i) that person in
good faith tendered an instrument to the claimant as full satisfaction of the
claim, (ii) the amount of the claim was unliquidated or subject to a bona fide
dispute, and (iii) the claimant obtained payment of the instrument, the fol-
lowing subsections apply.
(b) Unless subsection (c) applies, the claim is discharged if the person against
whom the claim is asserted proves that the instrument or an accompanying
written communication contained a conspicuous statement to the effect that
the instrument was tendered as full satisfaction of the claim.
Id. § 8.3A-311(a)-(b) (Repl. Vol. 2001 & Cum. Supp. 2003).
191. Gelles & Sons Gen. Contracting, Inc., 264 Va. at 289, 569 S.E.2d at 407.
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term or clause [to] be displayed in specific type or in any other
distinguishing manner."'92
The court then examined whether the language of the letter
was so unclear that a reasonable person would not know the
check was being offered in full satisfaction of the claim.'93 The
court distinguished Virginia Code section 8.3A-311 from the
common law of accord and satisfaction.'94 "Under the common
law, an accord and satisfaction requires both that the debtor in-
tend that the proffered amount be given in full satisfaction of the
disputed claim and that the claimant accept that amount in ac-
cordance with the debtor's intent."'95 In contrast, Virginia Code
section 8.3A-311 requires a plaintiff to satisfy an objective stan-
dard, as opposed to a subjective standard-"that is, would a rea-
sonable person have considered that the 'instrument was ten-
dered as full satisfaction of the claim?" 96 The court agreed with
the trial court and found that a reasonable person could interpret
the letter to mean the check constituted a final settlement of the
amount due to the contractor. 97
K. Permitting of Wireless Towers
In USCOC of Virginia RSA# 3, Inc. v. Montgomery County
Board of Supervisors,9 ' the United States District Court for the
Western District of Virginia was asked to decide a case arising
out of the denial of a special use permit request for a wireless
telecommunications transmission tower.'99 The application en-
countered no citizen opposition."' At the meeting where the spe-
cial use permit was denied, the Montgomery County Board of Su-
pervisors also granted a special use permit for a significantly
shorter tower. 0 1 However, the discussion among the board of su-
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 289-90, 569 S.E.2d at 407-08.
195. Id. at 289, 569 S.E.2d at 408.
196. Id. at 290, 569 S.E.2d at 408 (quoting Webb Bus. Promotions, Inc. v. Am. Elecs. &
Entm't Corp., 617 N.W.2d 67, 76 (Minn. 2000)).
197. Id. at 291, 569 S.E.2d at 408.
198. 245 F. Supp. 2d 817 (W.D. Va. 2003).
199. Id. at 818.
200. Id. at 824-25.
201. Id. at 823-24.
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pervisors at the public hearing, and the conditions imposed on the
issuance of a grant for the smaller tower, indicated that the board
of supervisors' actions were solely motivated by aesthetic con-
cerns.
20 2
The Telecommunications Act of 1996203 ("TCA") limits the
manner in which local governments may restrict the location and
design of towers.20 4 First, a local government's regulation of wire-
less facilities cannot "prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the
provision of personal wireless services. 20 5 Second, a local gov-
ernment's denial of a request to "place, construct, or modify" a
wireless service facility must "be in writing and supported by
substantial evidence contained in a written record."20 6 The court
determined that the board of supervisors satisfied the first prong
of the test by proposing an alternative site for the tower.2 7
Clearly the Montgomery County Board of Supervisors did not in-
tend to prohibit the provision of wireless services.2°8
Next, the court addressed whether the board of supervisors' de-
cision was supported by substantial evidence contained in a writ-
ten record.20 9 The court concluded that the scientific data before
the board of supervisors did not support or justify its decision to
reject the 240-foot tower and approve the 195-foot tower.210 No
evidence before the board of supervisors suggested that the two
towers were even roughly equivalent "from an engineering stand-
point."211 In ruling against the board of supervisors, the court
noted that the board's decision was based upon aesthetics alone,
and that settled Virginia law states that aesthetics "is not a valid
basis by itself for a zoning decision." 212 In some cases, aesthetics
may be considered if some other element within the locality's po-
lice power is also examined.2 3 The court concluded that the
202. See id.
203. 47 U.S.C. §§ 1-1110 (2000).
204. Id. § 332(c)(7)(B) (2000).
205. Id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II) (2000).
206. Id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) (2000).
207. USCOC of Va. RSA# 3, 245 F. Supp. 2d at 827.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 829.
210. Id. at 830.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 831.
213. Id.
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Montgomery County Board of Supervisors did not act as reason-
able legislators in reaching a decision about the towers, because
reasonable legislators would not base a decision solely upon a
principle that has previously been held invalid under Virginia
law. 214
III. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
A. Conveyances of Right-of-Way Usage
In balancing the concerns of property owners and the need to
allow certain service companies and utilities right-of-way ease-
ments, the Virginia Code now provides that it is unlawful for the
Department of Transportation to issue a land use permit to any
company other than a public utility, an owner or operator of an
interstate natural gas pipeline, or a cable company which owns or
operates a utility line,
unless such company has (i) registered as an operator with the ap-
propriate notification center as defined by § 56-265.15 and (ii) noti-
fied the commercial and residential developer, owner of commercial
or multifamily real estate, or local government entities with a prop-
erty interest in any parcel of land located adjacent to the property
over which the land use is being requested, that application for the
permit has been made.
215
B. Banking and Finance
1. Real Estate Brokerage Subsidiaries of Banks
The General Assembly amended the Banking Act to specify
that real estate brokers are not prohibited from owning or operat-
ing a state bank as long as the requirements imposed by the
Banking Act on all bank owners and operators are met.21 6 It also
added a section to the Banking Act providing the conditions un-
der which a state bank, through a controlled subsidiary corpora-
214. Id. at 832.
215. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-1151.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 2003).
216. Act of Mar. 18, 2003, ch. 536, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-5
(Cum. Supp. 2003)).
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tion, may own and operate a real estate brokerage firm.217 The
conditions established by this section are consistent with the
Banking Act's avoidance of anticompetitive activity218 and are
subject to Virginia Code section 6.1-58.1, which governs invest-
ments in stock or securities of controlled subsidiary corpora-
tions. 1 9
2. Priority of Mortgages Securing Payment of Amounts Due to
the Commonwealth
Under Virginia law, a mortgagee may refinance a first mort-
gage without altering its primary relationship to a subordinate
mortgage and without first notifying or obtaining the consent of
the subordinate mortgagor, provided that certain qualifications
are met.22° The 2003 General Assembly passed legislation provid-
ing that such a provision does not apply when the subordinate
mortgage is one securing a promissory note payable to the Com-
monwealth or any local government and financed pursuant to an
affordable dwelling unit ordinance if such mortgage states that it
shall not, without the consent of the secured party, be subordi-
nated.22
C. Computer Services and Uses
1. Remote Access to Land Records
The 2003 General Assembly amended the Virginia Code to re-
quire that remote access to land records be granted only through
subscription services provided by individual circuit court clerk's
217. Id. (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-58.3 (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
218. See id.
219. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-58.1 (Cum. Supp. 2003).
220. Id. § 55-58.3 (Repl. Vol. 2003). The refinance mortgage must state on the first
page in bold or capital letters the outstanding principal balance or the prior mortgage and
that it is a refinance of the prior mortgage. See id. § 55-58.3(B)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2003). The
principal amount secured by the refinance mortgage must not exceed the outstanding
principal balance secured by the prior mortgage plus $5,000. Id. § 55-58.3(B)(2,) (Repl. Vol.
2003). Further, the interest rate must be stated in the refinance mortgage when recorded,
and it must not exceed the rate of the prior mortgage. Id. § 55-58.3(B)(3) (Repl. Vol. 2003).
221. Act of Mar. 16, 2003, ch. 381, 2003 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-58.3(D) (Repl. Vol. 2003)).
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offices or through designated application service providers. 22
2. Prohibition on Posting Personal Information on the Internet
The General Assembly passed several measures in 2003 to help
protect the privacy rights of its citizens with regard to informa-
tion available over the Internet. One such piece of legislation pro-
hibits clerks of courts in Virginia from posting, on a court-
controlled Web site, a document containing any of the following
information: an actual signature, a social security number, a date
of birth identifiable to a particular person, a parent's maiden
name identifiable to a particular person, any financial account
numbers, or the name and age of a minor child.223 The statute
provides for an exception, however, for network systems that are
certified by the Department of Technology Planning to be secure,
and among other things, provide restricted access only to persons
whose identity, address, and citizenship status have been estab-
lished either in person or by means of a notarized or sworn appli-
cation.224
D. Conservation
1. Creation of Low Impact Development Task Force
A new task force was established to study low impact alterna-
tives to existing stormwater and water quality control methods.225
The task force will be comprised of eleven members appointed by
the Director of the Department of Environmental Quality
("DEQ").226 The task force, operating as an entity of the DEQ,
must develop a certification process for low impact development
techniques, provide guidance for local governments and the gen-
eral public on the most effective way to implement the tech-
niques, recommend changes to existing laws and regulations
222. Act of Mar. 16, 2003, ch. 205, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 17.1-279 (Repl. Vol. 2003)). This provision expires on July 1, 2008. Id.
223. Act of Apr. 2, 2003, ch. 988, 2003 Va. Acts _ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-
3808.2 (Cum. Supp. 2003)). This provision expires on July 1, 2005. Id.
224. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3808.2(D)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2003).
225. Id. § 10.1-1186.5 (Cum. Supp. 2003).
226. Id. § 10.1-1186.5(A) (Cum. Supp. 2003).
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which facilitate the use of the techniques, and create a model or-
dinance to be used by local governments.227
2. Conservation Easements
The Virginia Conservation Easement Act 228 establishes the re-
quirements for holders of conservation easements.229 Previously, a
sole holder of a conservation easement had to have maintained its
principal office in the Commonwealth for at least five years, while
any organizations not meeting this qualification could only be co-
holders of such easements with an entity that met the require-
ments. 230 Thus, national organizations could only co-hold conser-
vation easements under prior law.23' The 2003 General Assembly
amended the Conservation Easement Act to allow national or-
ganizations that have been in existence for five years or more,
have an office in the Commonwealth, and remain registered and
in good standing with the State Corporation Commission to be
sole holders of conservation easements.2 2
3. Enjoyment of Easements Generally
The General Assembly added a section to the Virginia Code
providing specified remedies for a breach of an easement. 233 The
new section states that "the owner of a dominant estate shall not
use an easement in a way that is not reasonably consistent with
the uses contemplated by the grant of the easement, and the
owner of the servient estate shall" in no way obstruct or other-
wise unreasonably interfere with the owner of the dominant es-
tate's enjoyment of the easement.234 The section states that a vio-
lation of the terms of an easement may constitute a private
227. Id. § 10.1-1186.5(A)-(B) (Cum. Supp. 2003).
228. Id. §§ 10.1-1009 to -1016 (Repl. Vol. 1998 & Cum. Supp. 2003).
229. Id. § 10.1-1010 (Cum. Supp. 2003).
230. Id. § 10.1-1010(C) (Repl. Vol. 1998).
231. Id.
232. Act of Apr. 2, 2003, ch. 1014, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 10.1-1010(C) (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
233. Act of Mar. 20, 2003, ch. 774, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 55-
50.1 (Repl. Vol. 2003)).
234. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-50.1 (Repl. Vol. 2003).
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nuisance; however, the remedy for any violation does not hinder
any other remedies provided in law or equity.235
E. Counties, Cities, and Towns
1. Compliance with Subdivision Ordinances
The Virginia Code provides that any subdivision, transfer, or
sale of a lot or parcel of land must comply with any applicable
subdivision ordinances. 236 The 2003 General Assembly of Virginia
amended the Virginia Code to clarify that any violation of such
ordinances carries with it a fine of not more than $500 per lot and
a requirement that the violator comply with the applicable ordi-
nances.
23 7
2. Replacement of Manufactured Housing
The Virginia Code assures landowners that their vested land
use rights will not be impaired by the subsequent amendment of
a zoning ordinance.238 Should such an amendment cause a land-
owner's current use of the land to be nonconforming, the land-
owner may continue such use so long as the buildings and struc-
tures on the land "are maintained in their then structural
condition" and the use is not discontinued for more than two
years.239 Virginia Code section 15.2-2307 also provides that the
owner of a mobile or manufactured home may remove a noncon-
forming manufactured home and replace it with a comparable
mobile or manufactured home that conforms with the current
HUD manufactured housing code. 240 The General Assembly also
modified Virginia Code section 15.2-2307 to specify what types of
mobile or manufactured homes may replace current nonconform-
ing mobile or manufactured homes--drawing a distinction be-
tween the requirements for a nonconforming mobile or manufac-
235. Id.
236. See id. § 15.2-2254 (Repl. Vol. 2003).
237. Act of Mar. 16, 2003, ch. 408, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 15.2-2254(4) (Repl. Vol. 2003)).
238. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2307 (Repl. Vol. 2003).
239. Id.
240. Id.
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tured home located within a mobile or manufactured home park
and one not located in such a park.24'
3. Establishment of Civil Penalties for Violations of the Zoning
Ordinance
The Virginia Code allows localities to implement a uniform
schedule of civil penalties for violations of the zoning ordinance.
24 2
It establishes maximum dollar amounts that may be assessed as
a penalty for violating the zoning ordinance.243 In 2003 the Gen-
eral Assembly increased the maximum penalty allowed for any
additional summons after an initial summons for any one viola-
tion to $250 and the maximum penalty for "a series of specified
violations arising from the same operative set of facts" to
$5,000.244 Prior to the change, the maximum penalty assessments
were $150 for an additional summons and $3,000 for a series of
specified violations.245
4. Regulation of Vehicular and Pedestrian Traffic in Residential
Subdivisions
Prior to amendment by the General Assembly, the Virginia
C6de allowed the governing body of any county, city, or town
which has adopted subdivision zoning ordinances to require "the
posting and maintenance of signs or other appropriate markings
regulating the operation and parking of motor vehicles and pe-
destrian traffic" in any residential subdivision in which roadways
and parking areas are "open to the public but not in public own-
ership."246 The General Assembly amended Virginia Code section
46.2-1305 by omitting the requirement that such roadways and
parking areas be open to the public.247
241. Act of Mar. 16, 2003, ch. 189, 2003 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 15.2-2307 (Repl. Vol. 2003)).
242. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2209 (Repl. Vol. 2003).
243. Id.
244. Act of Mar. 16, 2003, ch. 192, 2003 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 15.2-2209 (Repl. Vol. 2003)).
245. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2209 (Repl. Vol. 1997).
246. Id. § 46.2-1305 (Repl. Vol. 2002).
247. Act of Mar. 16, 2003, ch. 418, 2003 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 46.2-1305 (Supp. 2003)).
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5. Repair of Deteriorating Buildings
The General Assembly also amended the Virginia Code to allow
localities to prescribe civil penalties for violations of any ordi-
nance relating to the removal or repair of deteriorating build-
ings.248 Any penalty for violating this provision may not exceed a
total of $1,000.249
6. Comprehensive Plan for Affordable Housing
Prior to amendment in 2003, the Virginia Code required each
locality in the Commonwealth to develop a comprehensive plan
for the long term physical development of the territory under the
locality's jurisdiction. 20 The Virginia Code suggested that each
locality's plan include, among other things, "[tihe designation of
areas for the implementation of measures to promote the con-
struction and maintenance of affordable housing."2"' The 2003
amendment requires that each plan include the designation and
implementation of such measures and that similar measures be
included for the rehabilitation of existing affordable housing
units.25 2 The 2003 change places a greater duty on localities to set
out how maintenance and construction of affordable housing will
be accomplished.253
7. Community Development Authorities
The General Assembly amended two sections of the Virginia
Code to reflect that community development authorities are now
considered "public bod[ies] politic and corporate and political sub-
division[s] of the Commonwealth."254
248. Act of Mar. 16, 2003, ch. 207, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 15.2-906(5) (Repl. Vol. 2003)).
249. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-906(5) (Repl. Vol. 2003).
250. Id. § 15.2-2223 (Repl. Vol. 1997).
251. Id. § 15.2-2223(8) (Repl. Vol. 1997).
252. Act of Mar. 21, 2003, ch. 811, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 15.2-2223 (Repl. Vol. 2003)).
253. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2223 (Repl. Vol. 1997), with VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-
2223 (Repl. Vol. 2003).
254. Act of Mar. 19, 2003, ch. 712, 2003 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 15.2-5152, -5155 (Repl. Vol. 2003)).
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8. Plat Approval
In response to recent practice by certain county commissions
attempting to slow development by failing to act on proposed
plats, the General Assembly amended the requirements of local
planning commissions to compel them to make a good faith effort
to, within sixty days of submission for approval, specifically iden-
tify all deficiencies with the initial submission and reasons for
disapproval along with any modifications or corrections needed to
permit approval. 2" The revised provision also requires that local
planning commissions act on any proposed plat for which they
have previously denied approval within forty-five days after
modification and resubmission of the plot to the commission.256
Further, if the subdivider petitions the circuit court, as permitted
under Virginia Code section 15.2-2259(B), the court must "give
the petition priority on the civil docket, hear the matter expedi-
tiously," and enter an order as approving or rejecting the plat.257
9. Standard of Review for Board of Zoning Appeals
The 2003 General Assembly also amended the Virginia Code to
provide for a new, less stringent standard of review for board of
zoning appeals' orders, requirements, decisions, or other determi-
nations appealed to the circuit court.258 In such cases, the court
shall presume any decision of the board to be correct.259 However,
the presumption may be rebutted by proving by a preponderance
of the evidence that the board erred in its decision.26 ° In appeals
from decisions of the board denying an application for a variance
or for a special exception, a presumption also exists that the
board's decision is correct, but the presumption may only be re-
butted by a showing that the board applied erroneous principles
of law, or-if the board exercised discretion when rendering its
decision-that the board's decision was plainly wrong and vio-
255. Act of Mar. 19, 2003, ch. 716, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 15.2-2259(A) (Repl. Vol. 2003)).
256. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2259(A) (Repl. Vol. 2003).
257. Id. § 15.2-2259(B) (Repl. Vol. 2003).
258. Act of Mar. 18, 2003, ch. 568, 2003 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 15.2-2314 (Repl. Vol. 2003)).
259. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2314 (Repl. Vol. 2003).
260. Id.
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lated the zoning ordinance's intent and purpose.26' Current case
law providing for the latter standard of review for all board deci-
sions is therefore overturned.
10. Reimbursement of Property Taxes in Condemnation Cases
A new provision was added to the Virginia-Code requiring lo-
calities to reimburse property owners for the pro rata portion of
real property taxes paid by the property owner covering the pe-
riod subsequent to the date title vested in the locality or the date
the locality took possession of the real property, whichever occurs
earlier.2 6
2
11. Conservation of Trees During Development
The 2003 General Assembly amended the current provision of
the Virginia Code which allows localities to adopt ordinances re-
quiring planting and replacement of trees during the localities'
development process. 263 The amendments require local ordinances
to include "reasonable provisions for reducing the tree canopy re-
quirements or granting tree cover credit in consideration of the
preservation of existing tree cover or for preservation of trees of
outstanding age, size or physical characteristics." 2' The amen-
ments also allow such ordinances to designate certain tree species
that cannot be used to meet tree cover requirements due to their
undesirable nature.265
261. Id.
262. Act of Mar. 19, 2003, ch. 680, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 15.2-1904(E) (Repl. Vol. 2003)).
263. Act of Mar. 22, 2003, ch. 875, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 15.2-961(A) (Repl. Vol. 2003)).
264. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-961(C) (Repl. Vol. 2003)).
265. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-961(E) (Repl. Vol. 2003)). The
General Assembly made explicit the fact that none of the provisions in the legislation in-
validate the ten-year-minimum tree cover standards adopted by cities founded prior to
1780, or the twenty-year-minimum tree cover replacement standards adopted after July 1,
1990. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.2-961(K)-(L) (Repl. Vol. 2003)).
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F. Courts of Record
1. Requirement of Date and Time Stamp on All Recorded
Documents
In response to problems created by courts not recording in-
struments on the day of their delivery to the clerk due to the high
volume of such instruments received by some courts, the General
Assembly added a provision requiring any circuit court which
does not record documents on the same day they are delivered to
install a time stamp machine to affix the current date and time of
delivery to each document not immediately recorded and entered
into the general or daily index.266 The Virginia Code now also
states that the time of admission to the record shall be presumed
to be the date and time affixed to the instrument unless the clerk
determines that the requirements for recordation have not been
satisfied.267
2. Clerk's Right to Refuse Documents Containing Private
Information
Ever conscious of privacy concerns, the General Assembly of
Virginia amended the Virginia Code to allow court clerks to re-
fuse to accept instruments submitted for recordation if they in-
clude a grantor's, grantee's, or trustee's social security number.26
G. Eminent Domain
1. Requirements of Filing a Condemnation Proceeding
The Virginia Code was amended to require the Commonwealth
Transportation Commissioner ("Commissioner") to institute a
266. Act of Mar. 20, 2003, ch. 776, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-96(A)(3)(a) (Repl. Vol. 2003)). If, however, there is no time stamp machine or if
the time stamp machine is not functioning, an employee of the clerk's office shall affix the
current date and time of delivery to each instrument. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-96(A)(3)(b)
(Repl. Vol. 2003).
267. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-96(A)(3)(c) (Repl. Vol. 2003).
268. Act of Mar. 22, 2003, ch. 862, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 17.1-227 (Repl. Vol. 2003)).
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condemnation proceeding within 180 days after recordation of a
certificate with respect to property being taken or damaged, un-
less an agreement is reached with the affected property owner as
to compensation for the taking of or damage to the property.269
The Virginia Code also provides that if the Commissioner fails to
institute condemnation proceedings within 180 days after recor-
dation of any such certificate, the property owner may file a pro-
ceeding in the circuit court.
2. Recodification of Title 25--Eminent Domain
Pursuant to Virginia Code section 30-152,271 the Virginia Code
Commission ("Commission") recodified Title 25 as Title 25.1.272
Title 25 established the general procedure pursuant to which au-
thorities exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire prop-
erty on behalf of the Commonwealth. 273 The Commission rewrote
and restructured the title to clarify its provisions, amend sections
to reflect current practices, and eradicate archaic, obsolete, and
redundant language and provisions.274
H. Housing
1. Protection from Disclosure of Certain Records in the
Possession of Building Officials
The Virginia Freedom of Information Act ("VFOIA") 215 provides
for the protection of certain records which are excluded from the
VFOIA's disclosure requirements. 6 As one of its many anti-
terrorism measures, the General Assembly has added exclusions
for any and all portions of engineering and construction drawings,
269. Act of Mar. 16, 2003, ch. 317, 2003 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 33.1-127 (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
270. VA. CODE ANN. § 33.1-132 (Cum. Supp. 2003).
271. Id. § 30-152 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
272. Id. §§ 25.1-100 to -106 (Repl. Vol. 2003).
273. See id. §§ 25-46.1 to -46.36 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2002).
274. Id. § 25.1-100 (Repl. Vol. 2003) (editor's note). For additional discussion of the re-
codification of Title 25, see B. Paige E. Holloway, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Public
Utility Law, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 195, 221 (2003).
275. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.2-3700 to -3714 (Repl. Vol. 2001 & Cum. Supp. 2003).
276. Id. § 2.2-3705 (Cum. Supp. 2003).
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plans, or other documents:
that reveal critical structural components, security equipment and
systems, ventilation systems, fire protection equipment, mandatory
building emergency equipment or systems, elevators, electrical sys-
tems, telecommunications equipment and systems, and other utility
equipment and systems... the disclosure of which would jeopardize
the safety or security of any public or private commercial office,
multi-family residential or retail building or its occupants in the
event of terrorism or other threat to public safety.
2 7 7
The General Assembly also added a section which requires build-
ing code officials to institute procedures to ensure the safekeeping
of all such engineering and construction documents in their pos-
session."'
2. Ratio Utility Billing Systems
In addition to submetering and energy allocation systems al-
ready provided for in the Virginia Code,279 Virginia Code section
55-226.2(A) now also allows landlords to use ratio utility billing
systems to allocate portions of utilities owed among multiple ten-
ants of a commercial or residential building, provided that the
use of such a system is clearly stated in the rental agreement or
lease.2"° Landlords may allocate billings based on square footage,
the number of bedrooms, occupancy, or some other specifically
stated formula agreed upon in the rental agreement or lease.28 '
3. Condominium Act
a. Condominium Association Meetings Open to All Unit Owners
The General Assembly added language to the Virginia Code to
ensure that all committee and subcommittee meetings of the ex-
277. Act of Mar. 22, 2003, ch. 891, 2003 Va. Acts __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 2.2-3705(A)(39) (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
278. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 36-105.3 (Cum. Supp. 2003)). For
additional information regarding ratio billing, see Holloway, supra note 274, at 220.
279. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-245.2 (Repl. Vol. 2003).
280. Id. § 55-226.2(A) (Repl. Vol. 2003).
281. Id. § 55-226.2(F) (Repl. Vol. 2003).
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ecutive organ of a unit owners' association be open to all unit
owners.28 2 Prior to the 2003 amendments, it was unclear whether
all committee meetings must be open to all owners, or only meet-
ings of the full executive organ.283 The amendments also provided
that an executive organ of a unit owners' association is not re-
quired to obtain approval before disseminating material regard-
ing matters concerning the association.2"4
b. Responsibility for Insurance Deductibles
The Virginia Code, as amended in 2003, provides that, unless
specified in a condominium instrument, any insurance deducti-
bles paid due to damage to a condominium-the cause of which
originated in a common element of the condominium-must be
paid by the unit owners' association as a common expense. 2 5 If,
however, a deductible must be paid for damages to a condomin-
ium resulting from a cause originating in any unit or component
of the condominium, the owner of the unit must pay the deducti-
ble, regardless of whether the unit owner was negligent.286
c. Imposition of Additional Assessments for Common Expenses
The General Assembly also granted executive organs of unit
owners' associations the authority to impose additional assess-
ments on all unit owners, based on each unit owner's proportional
interests, to cover the common expenses of the association when
the executive body determines that the assessments levied are in-
287sufficient to cover such expenses. Written notice must be given
to each unit owner of the amount, reasons for, and due date of
any payment for additional assessments.28 8 If due in a lump sum,
payment may not be required until ninety days after the mailing
282. Act of Mar. 16, 2003, ch. 405, 2003 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-79.75(B) (Repl. Vol. 2003)).
283. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.75 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
284. Act of Mar. 16, 2003, ch. 405, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-79.75:1(B) (Repl. Vol. 2003)).
285. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.81(C) (Repl. Vol. 2003).
286. Id.
287. Act of Mar. 16, 2003, ch. 421, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-79.83(E) (Repl. Vol. 2003)).
288. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.83(E) (Repl. Vol. 2003).
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or delivery of the notice.28 9 Unit owners must pay the additional
assessment unless a majority of owners, at a meeting held within
sixty days of delivery of the notice, vote to rescind or reduce the
assessment.29 °
4. Property Owners' Association Act
a. Applicability
The 2003 General Assembly removed the $150 threshold previ-
ously imposed for determining whether an association is subject
to the Property Owners' Association Act ("POAA"). 291' The revi-
sions to the POAA-specifically Virginia Code section 55-511-
also establish when an association disclosure packet shall be
deemed unavailable for purposes of determining when a person
selling a lot must disclose that the purchaser may cancel the con-
tract.292
b. Amendments to Declarations
The provision establishing how declarations of property own-
ers' associations may be amended under the POAA now states
that any declaration recorded prior to July 1, 1999, may be
amended by a two-thirds vote of the property owners in the ab-
sence of a provision in the declaration specifying the procedure
for amendment.293
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Act of Mar. 16, 2003, ch. 422, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-511 (Repl. Vol. 2003)).
292. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-511(A)-(B) (Repl. Vol. 2003). The new language states
that:
the association disclosure packet shall be deemed not to be available if (i) a
current annual report has not been filed by the association with either the
State Corporation Commission pursuant to § 13.1-936 or with the Real Estate
Board pursuant to § 55-516.1, (ii) the seller has made a written request to the
association that the packet be provided and no such packet has been received
within 14 days in accordance with subsection E of § 55-512, or (iii) written
notice has been provided by the association that a packet is not available.
Id. § 55-511(A) (Repl. Vol. 2003).
293. Id. § 55-515.1(D) (Repl. Vol. 2003).
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5. Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act
a. Access to Cable and Other Television Facilities
The General Assembly also amended the Virginia Code to allow
landlords to enter into service agreements with television service
providers to market the providers' services and to allow the land-
lord to receive reasonable compensation for the marketing ser-
vices the landlord provides.294 Under these service agreements,
landlords may also be compensated for the value of the landlord's
property used by the provider.295
b. Terms and Conditions of Rental Agreements
The Virginia Code was amended to allow rental agreements to
contain a provision providing for the automatic renewal of the
agreement as well as provisions establishing the requirements for
notice of intent to vacate or terminate the agreement.296
c. Definition of Prepaid Rent
The General Assembly clarified the definition of prepaid rent
by adding the explanatory phrase: "paid more than one month in
advance of the rent due date."297
d. Confidentiality of Tenant Information
In a further attempt to protect the privacy rights of the citizens
of the Commonwealth, the General Assembly amended the Vir-
ginia Code to severely limit the circumstances under which in-
294. Act of Mar. 16, 2003, ch. 68, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-248.13:2 (Repl. Vol. 2003)).
295. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.13:2 (Rep]. Vol. 2003).
296. Act of Mar. 16, 2003, ch. 424, 2003 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-248.7(A) (Repl. Vol. 2003)).
297. Act of Mar. 16, 2003, ch. 425, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-248.4 (Repl. Vol. 2003)).
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formation pertaining to a tenant can be released and the type of
information that can be released by a landlord to third parties.298
e. Acceptance of Rent with Reservation
The General Assembly added a section to the Virginia Code to
codify the common law meaning of accepting rent under reserva-
tion.299 The new section clarifies the duties a landlord owes a ten-
ant upon accepting rent with reservation."°0 Under Virginia Code
section 55-248.34:1, when a landlord accepts rent with reserva-
tion during the pendency of any aspect of the tenant's material
noncompliance, the landlord does not waive his right to terminate
the tenancy.3"'
f. Award of Attorneys' Fees
The 2003 General Assembly also amended the circumstances
under which a landlord and tenant can recover attorneys' fees.30 2
Under prior law, a landlord or tenant could only recover attor-
neys' fees if the other party was found to be guilty of willful non-
compliance.30 3 Under the new law, a landlord and tenant may re-
ceive attorneys' fees unless the other party proves by a
preponderance of the evidence that its actions were reasonable
under the circumstances.3 4
298. Act of Mar. 16, 2003, ch. 426, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-248.9:1 (Repl. Vol. 2003)). Under the new law, a landlord may not release in-
formation pertaining to a tenant unless: (1) the tenant has given prior written consent; (2)
the information released is a matter of public record; (3) the information is a summary of
the tenant's payment record; (4) the information is a copy of a material noncompliance no-
tice that the tenant has failed to comply with a termination notice and the tenant did not
remain on the premises after the notice was issued; (5) the information is requested by a
law-enforcement or public safety official; or (6) the information is provided in the case of
an emergency. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.9:1 (Repl. Vol. 2003).
299. Act of Mar. 16, 2003, ch. 427, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 55-
248.34:1 (Repl. Vol. 2003)).
300. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.34:1 (Repl. Vol. 2003).
301. Id. § 55-248.34:1(B) (Repl. Vol. 2003).
302. Act of Mar. 16, 2003, ch. 363, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-248.21 (Repl. Vol. 2003)).
303. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-248.21, -248.31 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
304. Id. §§ 55-248.21, -248.31 (Repl. Vol. 2003).
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g. Security Deposits
The General Assembly amended the Virginia Code to clarify
that when a landlord owes a tenant any amount of money held as
a security deposit, that amount plus interest is to be applied to
offset any amount owed to the landlord by the tenant."5 In addi-
tion, Virginia Code section 55-248.15:2 was added as a new statu-
tory provision that sets forth a schedule of interest rates for secu-
rity deposits beginning with July 1, 1975.306
h. Definition of Rental Application
The Virginia Residential Landlord Tenant Act,30 7 as amended,
now provides a definition for "rental application.""' The defini-
tion establishes what information a landlord may ask a prospec-
tive tenant in determining whether the prospective tenant satis-
fies the requirements for becoming a tenant of the landlord.0 9
i. Mechanics' Liens
The Virginia Code requires general contractors claiming me-
chanics' liens to file a memorandum of lien no later than ninety
days after completion of their work.310 The 2003 General Assem-
bly placed an additional burden upon the general contractor to
file, along with the memorandum of lien, "a certification of mail-
ing of a copy of the memorandum of lien on the owner of the prop-
erty at the owner's last known address."31'
305. Act of Mar. 16, 2003, ch. 438, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-248.15:1 (Repl. Vol. 2003)).
306. Act of Mar. 16, 2003, ch. 438, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 55-
248.15:2(B) (Repl. Vol. 2003)).
307. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-248.2 to -248.40 (Repl. Vol. 2003).
308. See id. § 55-248.4 (Repl. Vol. 2003).
309. Id.
310. Id. § 43-4 (Supp. 2003).
311. Act of Mar. 19, 2003, ch. 698, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 43-4 (Supp. 2003)).
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j. Time Period for Recording Certificate of Satisfaction
Due to recent budget cuts and staffing shortages, the 2003
General Assembly extended the time period in which a circuit
court clerk must record a certificate of satisfaction before incur-
ring liability for civil damages.
312
k. Assignment of Penalty for Failure to Release a Deed of Trust
The Virginia Code provides a $500 penalty on a lien obligor for
the failure of a lien creditor to properly file a release of a deed of
trust or other lien on property.313 Furthermore, as a result of the
2003 amendments, no agent or attorney may take an assignment
of the penalty.314
1. Real Estate Appeals to Boards of Equalization and Circuit
Court
The 2003 General Assembly made several amendments to the
current process for appealing real estate assessments, the most
significant of which are discussed herein. First, the General As-
sembly extended the number of years in which an aggrieved per-
son may contest a real property assessment over the next few
years. 5 Specifically, Virginia Code section 15.2-717 states that:
[any person aggrieved by an assessment of real estate made by the
department of real estate assessments may apply for relief to the cir-
cuit court of the county within one year from December 31 of the
year in which such assessment is made for assessments made prior
to January 1, 2005; within two years from December 31 of the year
in which such assessment is made for assessments made on and af-
ter January 1, 2005, but prior to January 1, 2007; and within the
time frame as provided by general law pursuant to § 58.1-3984 for
assessments made on and after January 1, 2007.316
312. Act of Mar. 16, 2003, ch. 245, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-66.6 (Repl. Vol. 2003)). The provisions of this act expire on July 1, 2004. Id.
313. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-66.3(A)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2003).
314. Act of Mar. 19, 2003, ch. 745, 2003 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-66.3(A)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2003)).
315. Act of May 1, 2003, ch. 1036, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 15.2-717 (Repl. Vol. 2003)).
316. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-717 (Repl. Vol. 2003). Virginia Code section 58.1-3984, effec-
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Second, the General Assembly provided nine-year term limits for
members of boards of equalization.3 7 Third, the General Assem-
bly added a requirement that each member of a board of equaliza-
tion must take continuing education classes at least once every
four years.318
m. Repeal of Limit on Real Property a Church May Hold
The 2003 General Assembly repealed the limitation on the
amount of real property a church may hold. 9 Previously,
churches were only permitted to hold up to fifteen acres in a city
or town and up to 250 acres outside a city or town.32°
IV. CONCLUSION
The period from June 1, 2002, to June 1, 2003, was fairly ordi-
nary in terms of the number and types of cases decided in the
area of real estate. With the preoccupation of budgetary matters
in the General Assembly, the 2003 Session was not proactive as
in previous years. With several localities in the Commonwealth
actively seeking to slow development, litigation in the area of zon-
ing and vested rights should be very active in the coming year.
tive January 1, 2004, provides that an aggrieved person may apply to the circuit court: "(a)
within three years from the last day of the tax year for which any such assessment is
made, (b) within one year from the date of the assessment, [or] (c) within one year from
the date of the Tax Commissioner's final determination... whichever is later." Id. § 58.1-
3984 (Cum. Supp. 2003).
317. Act of May 1, 2003, ch. 1036, 2003 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-3374 (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
318. Id.
319. Act of Mar. 21, 2003, ch. 813, 2003 Va. Acts_
320. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-12 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
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